第72期公司财务与金融市场学术论坛
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导读:这个地球上一部分著名的公司如GoogleFacebook等实行了二元股权结构,即公司股票分为A股和B股两类,A股具有一股一票性质,而B股则具有一股多票性质。在这种结构中,传统的“一股一票”制度被打破。然而这种二元股权结构会带来什么样的经济后果???(重要符号重复三遍)欢迎光临第72期公司财务与金融市场学术论坛!

时间:2017526日(星期五)上午9:00-11:00

地点:南开大学商学院A602

报告题目:

Corporate Risk-Taking in Dual-Class Firms

(二元股权结构公司中的风险承担)

暨美国肯塔基大学金融专业硕士(MSF)宣讲会

报告人:Mark H. Liu 副教授

现为美国University of Kentucky Gatton商学院金融学副教授、金融专业硕士(MSF)项目负责人;先后毕业于美国Boston College(金融学博士)、加拿大University of Western Ontario(经济学硕士)、中国武汉大学(经济学学士);研究兴趣集中于公司投融资、金融机构、金融分析与战略决策;曾在Journal of Financial EconomicsJournal of Financial and Quantitative AnalysisFinancial ManagementJournal of Banking and FinanceJournal of Corporate Finance等美国顶尖金融学杂志上发表学术论文十数篇。

主持人:覃家琦  教授

主办方:财务管理系

论文摘要:

While costs associated with dual-class shares are widely documented, the benefits are seldom studied in the literature. We document that dual-class firms have fewer business segments, higher earnings volatility, higher cross-segment correlations in earnings and less diversified sales across different industry segments compared to propensity-matched single-class firms. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that dual-class shares can shield insiders from short-term market pressure so they can focus on riskier projects to enhance long-term shareholder value. The dual-class share structure increases the market valuation of dual-class firms with high corporate risks, in contrast to the finding in the literature that dual-class firms trade at lower valuations. To provide a possible channel through which dual-class firms can increase corporate risk-taking, we find that dual-class firms are more likely to engage in mergers and acquisitions (M&As), especially nondiversifying M&As. Corporate risks increase following M&As, and the increase is more for dual-class firms than for single-class firms.